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Tuts 4 You

Cache Missing For Fun and Profit

Teddy Rogers

About This File

We describe the construction of a channel between processes via the state of a shared memory cache, and its use in the cryptanalysis of RSA. Unlike earlier side-channel attacks involving memory caches, our attack has the remarkable property of only requiring that a single private key operation be observed.

We also discuss other methods in which this channel might be abused, and provide some suggestions to processor designers, operating system vendors, and the authors of cryptographic software as to how this and related attacks could be mitigated or eliminated entirely.

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